

The Fiji General Election of 1982: The Tidal Wave That Never Came

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CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE PACIFIC

The Fiji General Election of 1982

The Tidal Wave that Never Came

INDEPENDENT FIJI'S FOURTH GENERAL ELECTION WAS WIDELY REGARDED BY THE PRESS, politicians and public at large, as holding the promise of an extremely close, unpredictable, and perhaps even an historically significant outcome.¹ The country's major political parties, the Alliance and the newly formed National Federation Party (NFP)-Western United Front (WUF) Coalition, both claimed for themselves a tidal wave of multi-racial support, something which has remained an elusive dream ever since the emergence of party politics in Fiji. They began by addressing themselves to non-racial social and economic issues, though in the last leg of the campaign appeal to ethnicity reached proportions not seen since the days of the 1968 by-election. Both the parties were remarkably well prepared in terms of funds and strategy and the professionalism with which they conducted the campaign, though perhaps the Alliance's organizational sophistication and superiority proved the decisive factor in its victory. The final outcome remained in doubt till the end as the protracted, high-pitched, bitter campaign continued unabated to the last day of polling. The melodrama of the Australian Broadcasting Commission's television programme 'Four Corners' with ensuing allegations and counter-allegations heightened tension and increased interest in the outcome.

When the final results came in by mid-day Sunday 19 July, after a week's polling, the Alliance had won 28 of the 52 seats in the House of Representatives and the NFP-WUF Coalition 24 seats. The Fijian Nationalist Party (FNP)—which had been such a potent political force in 1977, and had since then maintained a mystifyingly low profile, fuelling various speculations about its actual strength—failed to secure a single seat. Its only hope, party secretary Sakiasi Butadroka, lost to his old Alliance rival Tomasi Vakatora by 4,071 votes. Equally significant was the defeat of Ratu Osea Gavidi, the president and guiding light of a new Fijian splinter party, the Western United Front. In both the elections of 1977 he had won the Nadroga-Navosa Fijian Communal seat as an Independent; this time he succumbed (4,682 votes) to Alliance's Dr Apenisa Kuruisaqila (4,926 votes).² The message in the poor showing at the polling booth of the WUF, the FNP and another fledgling organization, the National Farmers and Labour Party (NFLP), which quietly vanished sometime during the campaign, was the deeply entrenched position of the two-party system in Fiji. Splinter parties and also Independents, whatever their merits and qualifications, would face great difficulty in making any impact on the average voter. The anticipated tidal wave, even a large current, of multiracial support for the Alliance and the NFP-WUF Coalition, failed to materialize. Instead, the past pattern of overwhelmingly racial politics was starkly rein-

¹ I am grateful to the University of the South Pacific Research Committee for supporting my research on the election. For their help, I am very grateful to Mr Peter Howard, Supervisor of Elections, my colleague, Mr Simione Durutalo, and many other people who shared their thoughts with me. This article is based on a paper presented to the Pacific History Association, Katoomba, NSW, August 1982.

² At the time of this writing (August 1982) Ratu Osea Gavidi had filed a writ in the Supreme Court contesting the election for his seat null and void, arguing that his opponents had breached the provisions of the Fiji Electoral Regulation. Three other Coalition candidates have followed suit: Ratu Napolioni Dawai, Joape Rokosoi, and Mumtaz Ali.

forced, as Fijians and General Electors rallied behind the Alliance and Indians stuck with the NFP in proportionately greater numbers than ever before.

Racial feelings and animosities engendered during the campaign, especially towards the end, manifested themselves in a variety of ways in the tense aftermath of the election. Some Fijian villagers in western Viti Levu felt particularly outraged at the manner in which their Indian tenants had passed through the Alliance shed but had voted for the Coalition, thus causing the unexpectedly poor showing of the Alliance candidates. They therefore banned some Opposition parliamentarians from the area from entering certain Fijian villages, while calls were made to evict Indian tenants with overdue rents. These actions, together with sporadic acts of apparently racially and politically motivated violence in Navua and Labasa,³ are forceful reminders of the depth of the traumas of the campaign and of some of its residual bitterness. Aggravating the feeling of unease and uncertainty was the government's uncanny silence. The legacies of the 1982 election will remain with the people of Fiji for a long time to come.

WHEN nominations closed on 21 May 1982, 144 candidates had filed their papers, but six subsequently withdrew. The Alliance, as usual, fielded candidates for all 52 seats, as also this time did the NFP-WUF Coalition.⁴ The FNP put forward a record 27 names,⁵ while there were seven Independents. The process of selecting candidates was initially a major hurdle for both the Alliance and the Coalition, and some of its ramifications influenced the character of the campaign. The Alliance launched itself from a position of strength based on experience of governing, and a unified and disciplined party led by a person of formidable stature and magnetism, Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara. But 12 years of governing had also bred lethargy and stagnation in the parliamentary group. It was an open secret that Ratu Mara wanted an infusion of new blood in the final candidate line up, but his problem was complicated by the fact that he had to deal with 36 sitting parliamentarians. The past procedure whereby the Selection Committee merely endorsed the name put forward from the primaries, while useful in maintaining a semblance of democratic grassroots consultation, could have thwarted this goal. Instead, an all-powerful 10-person Selection Committee headed by Ratu Mara (who was the only candidate on it) was empowered to screen all applications and make the final recommendation.

The new procedure was criticized as being a 'dangerous political experiment'⁶ by James Shankar Singh, President of Indian Alliance; but his was a lone voice of dissent. The committee toured the country and interviewed all prospective candidates. When the final list was prepared, seven sitting parliamentarians had failed to get re-endorsement.

Two aspects of the Alliance selection proceedings were particularly noteworthy. One was the treatment meted out to the Young Alliance. Jone Banave, its president, failed to hold his seat, while other aspirants such as Seci Nawalowalo, Jo Nacola and Joape Rokosoi, Lord Mayor of Suva, were simply shunted aside. It should be noted that in the 1972 General Election the Young Alliance had played an important role in

³ On all this see the *Fiji Sun*, 3 and 4 Aug. 1982, and the *Fiji Times*, 24, 29 and 31 July 1982.

⁴ WUF contested six Fijian Communal seats and two Fijian National seats. NFP contested six Fijian Communal seats, eight Fijian National seats and all Indian and General Elector seats.

⁵ FNP contested 10 Fijian Communal seats, 10 Fijian National seats, three General Elector Communal and four National seats.

⁶ *Fiji Times*, 16 and 17 July 1981. *Fiji Sun*, 18 July 1981.

its party's victory. Ten years later, the party hierarchy, particularly Mara, saw its now not-so-Young Alliance as performing the role of communication, and providing the party with 'back-up service support',⁷ instead of competing for its own share of power. The other was the fate of the Indian Alliance, teetering on the brink of an ignominious collapse. Many of its founding members had either left the party or were denied a ticket. Sir Vijay R. Singh, former Alliance Attorney General, had left the party in 1979 when he was dismissed from the cabinet after controversy and speculation about the extent of his involvement in the now famous Flour Mills of Fiji court case. On 16 January 1982 he joined the Ba Branch of the NFP.⁸ Another former Alliance minister, M. T. Khan, was not reinstated into the cabinet after being unsuccessfully tried for corruption as a minister of the Crown. He, too, joined the NFP and was a candidate until his death. And in May 1982 came the resignation of James Shankar Singh from the Alliance on grounds of irreconcilable differences between himself and the Prime Minister, but not, interestingly, with the party. His hard-hitting, emotional criticism of the Prime Minister carried conviction with Indians, as even the Alliance knew that Singh was an upright man of principle who had relinquished his ministerial status in January 1979 on a point of principle⁹ when he felt unable to support his party's stand on the new cane contract. On one occasion he recounted his long experience in the Alliance as follows:

It is my sad experience throughout the existence of the party that Indian Alliance leaders and members have merely been made tools or vehicles of convenience by the party leader, and once the general election is over and Ratu Sir Kamisese conveniently seated in the Prime Minister's chair, he treats them like a bunch of coolies.¹⁰

Ratu Mara was casually dismissive about the impact of the desertion by the Indian Alliance luminaries. Expression of support for the Alliance from Gujerati and Muslim communities was encouraging, as also was the arrival of much needed new talent. One of the new faces was Dr Ahmed Ali of the University of the South Pacific, who countered Singh's criticism with the reminder that it was Indians, and not others, who dominated the professions and the business world, lived in the best suburbs and enjoyed the latest amenities of the *petit bourgeois* world.¹¹ There were very few other countries where Indians had done as well as in Fiji. His assertions were to become something of a minor campaign issue themselves. At the end of the process of candidate selection, Ratu Mara emerged in full control of a tightly knit, well disciplined party.

Jai Ram Reddy, leader of the NFP, was confronted with a far more difficult problem. Perhaps the most delicate task for him, apart from retaining his own leadership, was maintaining the apparently fragile unity of the party that had so painstakingly been achieved after the internecine struggles of 1977.¹² The Dove and Flower factions which had emerged after the April elections and fed on deep cultural, religious and social divisions in the Indian community, constantly threatened to erupt despite a

⁷ *Fiji Times*, 20 July 1981; *ibid.*, 10 Jan. 1982. For the Young Alliance's role in 1972, see Ahmed Ali, 'The Fiji General Election of 1972', *Journal of Pacific History*, VIII (1973), 171-80.

⁸ *Fiji Times*, 18 Jan. 1982.

⁹ See Ahmed Ali's comments in *South Pacific Island Business News* (June 1980), p. 17. See also his *Fiji: From Colony to Independence, 1874-1970* (Suva 1977), 62-3, where he charmingly describes Singh as 'a Christian businessman with Arya Samaj connections'.

¹⁰ *Fiji Times*, 11 Jan. 1982.

¹¹ See Ahmed Ali's interview with Robert Keith-Reid, *Fiji Times*, 3 Apr. 1982. Also *Fiji Times*, 17 June 1982.

¹² For more discussion see Ahmed Ali, *Plantation to Politics: Studies on Fiji Indians* (Suva, 1980), ch. 7.

semblance of public peace and reconciliation achieved in July 1979.¹³ Making matters even more complicated was the lack of rapport between Siddiq Koya, the former leader of the Doves and of the NFP, and Reddy, the Flower leader. Thus, the mantle of the party leader never rested comfortably with Jai Ram Reddy. Clearly Reddy wanted to keep the advantage he had gained in the September 1977 elections when his Flower faction had won 13 seats (58.2% of the total Indian communal votes) to the Dove's 3 (41.9%). To shore up his position further, he intended to bring in new faces who were either loyal to him or at least neutral, and to keep the more die-hard Doves out. It was against the background of these calculations that the NFP's nine-member Selection Committee of which Reddy was the chairman (and which also included Koya) screened applications and interviewed candidates across the country. Its proceedings were shrouded in unprecedented secrecy; even the total number of applicants was not known. Despite some threats of internal revolt,¹⁴ the committee successfully completed the protracted business of selecting candidates. When the final names were announced, it was clear that Reddy had had his way, possibly at some cost to the party. Some of the most vocal former Doves had not been considered for a party ticket, despite Koya's position on the committee, his thinly veiled public protests and even threats of withdrawing from the election altogether.¹⁵ Soon afterwards, Reddy further consolidated his position by orchestrating a unanimous vote of confidence in himself as the party leader, and prime minister should his party win, from the Coalition candidates, including Koya.¹⁶

As both parties wound up their selection work, it became clear that one party's loss was the other's gain: frustrated aspirants crossed the floor; some also stood as Independents. For the Alliance, the loss of Fijian members was not too serious, except possibly that of Joape Rokosoi and Tui Nadi, Ratu Napolioni Dawai. The defection of virtually the entire Indian Alliance establishment was of greater concern, though as noted above the party publicly discounted the possibility of any serious loss of Indian support. The NFP's gain, however, was counteracted by the loss from its ranks of some long-serving (Dove) members. Two of them became painful thorns in the NFP side during the campaign. One was Surendra Prasad, a Lautoka based lawyer and national president of the Arya Samaj, a large Hindu religious group. He was the Alliance candidate against Jai Ram Reddy. Because of his own standing in the Indian community, Prasad provided a formidable challenge to Reddy, and effectively tied him to the Lautoka Indian Communal constituency. The leader of the NFP was thus prevented from projecting for himself a more national image, or campaigning in the marginal seats in southeastern Viti Levu. In contrast, Ratu Mara travelled the country tirelessly and campaigned in all the constituencies. His image as a national leader, already strong, was enhanced even further. The defection of Raojibhai Patel, another Dove, to the Alliance provided NFP's deputy leader Mrs Irene Jai Narayan with tough opposition, preventing her, too, from moving outside her constituency. Another important

¹³ Jai Ram Reddy himself conceded that 'it would be naive of me to say that there are no Flower-Dove strains', but added that 'they are not significant and they have been whittled away to a remarkable extent'. *Fiji Times*, 15 Dec. 1981.

¹⁴ The Navua Branch of the NFP, e.g., called for the dissolution of the Selection Committee and asked instead for the re-endorsement of those candidates who had fought in the 1977 April elections. *Fiji Times*, 20 Feb. 1982.

¹⁵ Koya was particularly adamant about getting party tickets for Surendra Prasad, Kalu Karan Singh and Sharda Nand. In the end only Nand became a candidate.

¹⁶ See *The Coalition Bulletin*, Apr. 1982; *Fiji Sun*, 18 Apr. 1982.

effect of the defections was to keep alive persistent rumours about Flower-Dove strains in the party.

The extent of 'party-switching' was remarkable, but what was perhaps more astonishing was the apparent ease with which the switches were made, without any public loss of face or political credibility of the defectors. Such a process would not have been possible in 1972 or even, for that matter, in 1977. Many reasons were given for the switches,¹⁷ but in the ultimate analysis, the failure to win a party ticket was the most important. At least one candidate, Joape Rokosoi, was candid about his reasons for joining the NFP on the eve of the election. He said: 'The Alliance is a good party, and its leadership is superb, but one must look to one's own career'.¹⁸ Rokosoi had failed to win an Alliance ticket.

One effect of the extensive defections was that both the parties played down their sharp ideological differences and glossed over thorny, divisive issues of the past. Once again the Alliance, with its public image of multiracial composition and creditable record in government, had less of a problem here than the NFP which had yet to outgrow its predominantly Indian image and extend its multiracial base. As early as 1974, Reddy had told the NFP convention in Nadi that 'if the National Federation Party is aspiring to govern, then it must acquire a broadly based support among all the races in Fiji. Unless the party acquires such support it must resign itself to being a permanent opposition.'¹⁹ He urged his colleagues to eschew the politics of provocation. Reddy was able to pursue his aims more actively after he assumed the leadership of the NFP in 1977. His task was made somewhat easier by the departure of the old guard whose visions were coloured by their struggles against the Colonial Sugar Refining Company and the colonial government. The memory of A. D. Patel, the founder of the NFP and something of a mythical figure to most Indians, had been a powerful rallying force in the past, but in 1982 it no longer excited the imagination of the post-independence generation. In fact his name was hardly ever mentioned.

The old principles of the party were also relegated to the background. The form of the constitution, a great rallying cry in the past, was now acknowledged an accomplished fact with little possibility of change or modification; the attainment of common roll, that is one person one vote, never considered a practical reality by Fijians and Europeans, almost vanished into oblivion; land, a central issue in the 1972 campaign, had become neutralized through the acceptance of the Agricultural Landlord and Tenants Ordinance (1976); and education, a crucial issue in the April 1977 elections, was diffused with the allocation of university scholarships on a 50-50 principle.²⁰ The old platforms were quietly discarded; the ascent of Jai Ram Reddy to the leadership of the NFP closed one era in Indian politics and heralded another, looking into the future rather than harking back to the past.

The problem of attracting more Fijian support remained. Neither the merger of the Fijian National Democratic Party with the Federation Party — thus leading to the creation of the NFP — in 1968 nor the ill-fated Operation Taukei in 1970 had increased the

¹⁷ James Shankar Singh left because of dissatisfaction with the Alliance (Mara's) leadership; Surendra Prasad joined the Alliance because NFP associated itself with supposedly 'irresponsible' Fijians of the WUF, and Kaur Battan Singh crossed over to the Alliance because the NFP now no longer lived by the founding principles of the party. Yet, interestingly enough, these very same people (and others) had applied for tickets from the party they eventually deserted!

¹⁸ *Fiji Times*, 9 and 10 Jan. 1982.

¹⁹ *National Federation Party, Souvenir Programme* (Nadi 1974).

²⁰ For further discussion, see Ahmed Ali, *Plantation to Politics . . .* and Robert Norton, *Race and Politics in Fiji* (St Lucia 1977).

NFP's appeal to the Fijians. In the 1972 general election, the NFP won a mere 2.4% of Fijian communal votes, a figure which declined markedly within the next five years as later discussion will show. But in 1982 this problem appeared to be solved with the offer of a coalition from an exclusively Fijian organization, the Western United Front.

The inspiring force behind the formation of the WUF, Ratu Osea Gavidi, had won the Nadroga-Navosa Fijian Communal seat in 1977. He had done so as an Independent, a fact which testified to his immense popularity which was predominantly the result of his stand on the pine dispute. In the minds of most people outside the west, the origin of the WUF and the pine issue are intricately interlinked, one and the same thing. The relationship needs to be explored further.

Pine (*Pinus caribaea* var *hondurensis*) planting began in Fiji in the late 1950s and early 1960s, and a decade later the pine industry promised to supply a major export item for Fiji.²¹ In 1979, about 28,000 hectares were under pine, especially on the western side (see Table 1),²² which was approximately half the total projected area under pine by 1986 (60,000 ha). With rapid expansion in the pine plantation schemes and the growing complexity of the entire operation, the government under the Fiji Pine Commission Act 1976 established the Fiji Pine Commission (FPC), a statutory corporation required to 'facilitate and develop an industry based on the growing, harvesting, processing and marketing of pine and other species of trees grown in Fiji'.²³ The pine industry was not the exclusive domain of the FPC, although it controlled the largest segment of the industry. The other major 'partner' in the industry was the landowners, assisted by the Fiji Department of Forestry. Hence, a successful and efficient operation of the pine industry depended upon a close co-operation between the landowners (*mataqali*) and the FPC.

TABLE 1—Main Pine areas in Fiji (1980)

Forest	Stocked Area	Potentially Stock-able Area	Non-Establish-able Area	Gross Area
Nabou	9,403	18,101	3,596	21,697
Nadi	1,913	7,776	3,879	11,655
Lololo	10,830	13,530	1,884	15,414
Ra	3,031	5,176	2,215	7,391
Bua	2,471	5,230	652	5,882
	27,648	49,813	12,226	62,039

To harvest the pine and to develop an overall export industry, the FPC invited proposals from interested companies. Four serious ones were received. The FPC accepted British Petroleum (South-West Pacific) Ltd's initial proposals in preference to those

²¹ I am indebted to Mr Simone Durutalo for sharing with me his extensive knowledge of the pine industry. He is in fact preparing a monograph on the subject.

²² Ewen Gregor, FPC General Manager, 'Current status and development in the pine industry', *FPC Information Update*, 7 Feb. 1980.

²³ *Ibid.*; see also the *Fiji Pine Commission Act* (No. 5 of 1976).

submitted by M. K. Hunt Foundation, Shell/New Zealand Forest Products and an American company, United Marketing Corporation. It did so because the BP 'pre-feasibility study outshone the others in terms of flexibility, equitable distribution of profits, and sensible management of the resource for the future'.²⁴ The landowners, however, disagreed, and preferred the UMC's proposals instead. To them the Corporation offered a scheme of pine exploitation which recognized legitimate landowner rights, offered a greater share of profits, and allowed participation at all levels of the industry. As Ratu Osea Gavidi put it, the Fijians, in the UMC's proposals, would *not* be 'mere cogs in the wheel', but equal partners with pine logging business.²⁵ Pressure from landowners forced the FPC to consider a revised proposal from the UMC. But the FPC remained unmoved. 'It is still (our) confirmed view', the FPC declared, 'that the UMC proposal should not be accepted. This company appears to lack an understanding of forest management, wood processing, and the social-economic implications of this project to Fiji and the landowners. UMC has no previous experience in forestry or natural resources.'²⁶ Subsequently, the government discovered that the head of UMC, Arizona businessman Paul Sandblom, had a criminal record of conviction for fraud, and had been in a penitentiary. It therefore declared him a prohibited immigrant.

The simmering conflict between Ratu Osea Gavidi, representative of the landowners and the FPC, and through it the government, erupted into the open. The landowners boycotted FPC pine stations and its planting programmes and withdrew from the Commission itself until Sandblom was allowed into the country. The Alliance made an issue of Paul Sandblom and asked the Coalition, especially in the early part of the campaign, to explain its position. Ratu Osea Gavidi replied: 'My fight is for Mr Sandblom to be allowed into Fiji to explain his proposals. My fight is for an objective evaluation of all proposals by all parties. I'm committed to promoting the pine industry, the interest of the landowners, and indeed of Fiji and I am not about to surrender this obligation for the private gain of any company or person, Mr Sandblom included.'²⁷ Gavidi had shifted his ground somewhat, but he effectively defused a potentially explosive issue.

To the western landowners, the Alliance government's action was generally interpreted as yet another instance of undesirable interference with their legitimate right to utilize their land in the manner they proposed. They preferred, as the NFP-WUF *Manifesto* clearly spelled out, 'the establishment of *decentralized*, socially compatible, technologically appropriate and economically viable processing systems for both native and exotic forests and [assisting] *direct* participation by owners of forested lands in the exploitation of such forest resources'.²⁸ Separated from personalities and politics, the ultimate debate concerned the issue of decentralized or landowner control and centralized or FPC (government) control of a resource that clearly has the potential to become a major revenue earner for Fiji.

The pine dispute intensified tensions and exacerbated the already cold relations between Ratu Osea Gavidi and Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara. It revived, too, the lingering, though rarely publicly espoused, resentments of some western Fijians against the peripheral treatment they felt they had received at the hands of the eastern (Bau-Lau)

²⁴ Leigh Martin, 'Political blackmail over the Green Gold', *Island Business News*, Aug. 1981, p. 5.

²⁵ *Fiji Times*, 22 May 1982.

²⁶ Martin, 'Political blackmail . . .', 6.

²⁷ Remarks made at a Lautoka rally reported in the *Fiji Times*, 24 May 1982.

²⁸ *National Federation Party and Western United Front Coalition Manifesto: 1982 General Elections*, p. 39.

chiefly establishment. They drew attention to the paucity of western Fijians in high positions in the civil service, provincial administration, statutory bodies and the like, a disparity which seemed especially glaring in contrast to their over-all contribution to the economy. These issues were brought into sharper relief when a debate in the House of Representatives to allocate \$435,868 for the reconstruction and renovation of certain historic sites on Bau, especially the chiefly grave of Ratu Seru Cakobau, led to the resignation from the Alliance of the Tui Nadi, Ratu Napolioni Dawai. He pointed to more pressing needs of western Fijians—education, water supply, roads, dormitories for school children from outer islands, which had long been neglected by the government—and argued that such a large expenditure in the prevailing circumstances was unjustified.²⁹ For his characteristically outspoken views, Ratu Napolioni was vilified in the senate by the Great Council of Chiefs nominees, and dubbed a minor 'silly', 'sub-chief'. The debate spilled over into the press,³⁰ and served to highlight the west-east disparities.

Clearly, then, there was a deeper pool of subterranean resentment, besides that caused by the pine dispute. The WUF was formed in July 1981 to harness these and to articulate the aspirations of 'the small people, or the grassroots people in the West, [who] have been neglected for far too long and [who] are completely unhappy with the government's policies'.³¹ The WUF was formally launched on 17 July 1981 in Nadi witnessed by some 600 Fijians and 20 high ranking chiefs³² of the Western Division, despite the possibility of a protest demonstration by supporters of the Fijian Association.³³ Ratu Osea Gavidu was elected President and Isikeli Nadalo Secretary. The constitution of the party was presented, discussed and approved. Among other things, the WUF wanted to:

- 1 Protect and encourage the unity of western Fijians.
- 2 Protect and encourage political, social, business and traditional interests of its members.
- 3 Protect the interests of landowners and defend their rights to develop their resources according to their aspirations.
- 4 Seek changes in the Ministry of Fijian Affairs and Rural Development to improve the lives of western Fijians.
- 5 Improve educational facilities for western Fijians and to provide them opportunities in commercial and industrial enterprises.
- 6 Fight for the freedom of association and religious expression of Fijians in the west and to elect representatives to Parliament.³⁴

The WUF obviously was primarily a regional Fijian splinter party. To become an effective national political force it needed more widely-based multiracial support. To

²⁹ See *Fiji Times*, 25 Feb. 1982. The NFP was caught in a bind. The idea to preserve historic sites on Bau had, in fact, been advocated by A. D. Patel in the 1960s, and the NFP was reminded of this by Ratu Sir Penaia Ganilau. The WUF members, Osea Gavidu and Isikeli Nadalo, supported Ratu Napolioni.

³⁰ See e.g. the comments of Saimone D. Waqa and Esira Rabuno in the *Fiji Times*, 11 and 23 Mar. 1982 respectively. A more scholarly treatment of the east-west controversy may be found in Norton, *op. cit.*, and in his paper 'The political process and society in Fiji', presented to the 12th Annual Conference of the Australian Political Studies Association, Canberra, Australian National University, Aug. 1970.

³¹ Isikeli Nadalo's words quoted in the *Fiji Times*, 9 July 1981.

³² Among the high chiefs present were Tui Yakete, Ratu Jone Madakaibitu, Tui Nawaka, Ratu Meli Naevo, Tui Conua, Ratu Isireli Tawaki, Tui Rukuruku, Ratu Iliasa Nabati, Tui Nasikawa, Ratu Epi Batirege, and Tui Namatiku, Ratu Viliame Vatureba.

³³ *Fiji Sun*, 17 July 1981.

³⁴ For a summary, see *Fiji Times*, 17 July 1981.

attain this goal, the possibility of a coalition with other parties had been mooted early, in fact on the very day the party was launched. Then, Gavidí had expressed a preference for a coalition *after* the election 'when we will win enough seats in the Western Division to hold the balance of power and thus force a coalition'.³⁵ The coalition, he hoped, would be the forerunner of a national government. Initially, it would appear, he attempted to broaden the WUF base by trying to 'moderate' Sakiasi Butadroka, leader of the FNP. However, efforts to form a progressive Fijian front with him were abandoned when Butadroka assaulted an Alliance minister of state, Solomone Momoivalu, on the steps of the parliament for accusing him of practising *draunikou* (voodooism) to attract Fijian voters.³⁶ Gavidí had also been broaching the idea of a coalition with the NFP in the latter half of 1981 for it was the most prominent party opposed to the Alliance.³⁷ By December, the idea had become a distinct probability. On 11 January 1982, an agreement was reached in Suva to form an NFP and WUF Coalition.³⁸

The exact terms and agreements of the Coalition were never made public. But its significant aspects were stressed in an interview by Jai Ram Reddy:

In this arrangement *each party is to maintain its independent identity and objectives*. In other words, there is no submergence of one party into another . . . It must be remembered that the two parties are totally independent with interests that each would like to protect . . . I don't envisage that where parties are independent and are being led by strong leadership with principles that they themselves espouse there is any real danger of anyone becoming subservient. *It is a partnership of equals*.³⁹

Both the parties agreed to set up a manifesto committee to evolve common policies for the general election and to co-operate in the selection of (Fijian National) candidates. More importantly, they agreed not to make land and several other 'sensitive' areas issues in the campaign.

To its admirers and supporters, the Coalition was a wonderful experiment in multiracial co-operation, with truly historic possibilities. To its critics it represented an 'unholy political association'⁴⁰ of convenience, hastily devised to topple the Alliance from power. As for the WUF, Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara told almost 1,000 delegates attending the Fijian Association convention at Rakiraki a day after the launching of the new party that it was a 'disruptive' force which preached 'ridiculous political ideologies'⁴¹ for selfish gain. In a certain sense, the Coalition was, indeed, an arrangement of convenience. Through it Ratu Osea Gavidí gained an opportunity to launch himself as a national figure using the already extensive machinery of the NFP; and in the end he emerged as something of a charismatic folk hero to his supporters. Jai Ram Reddy, on the other hand, gained what appeared to be a swelling pool of dependable Fijian support without being burdened with the additional expenditure of having to recruit it. Yet, it should also be noted that the decision to form a coalition entailed quite considerable risks for both the leaders, especially without the guarantee of success. For Reddy, association with an avowedly regionalist Fijian party detracted from his

³⁵ *Fiji Sun*, 17 July 1981.

³⁶ *Fiji Times*, 21 Apr. 1982.

³⁷ *Fiji Times*, 12 Dec. 1981.

³⁸ *The Coalition Bulletin*, No. 1 (Feb. 1982).

³⁹ *Ibid.* My italics.

⁴⁰ *Fiji Times*, 15 Nov. 1981.

⁴¹ *Fiji Sun*, 18 July 1981; *Fiji Times*, 18 July 1981.

carefully cultivated, though potentially volatile image as a national leader. The fact that he decided to form a coalition, without full consultation with even the parliamentary group of the NFP,⁴² let alone the rank and file members, had its dangers for his own leadership. For Gavidi, the risk was perhaps greater, coalescing as he was with a predominantly Indian party whose appeal among Fijian voters had always been abysmally low. The Coalition, then, was an act of convenience, but it also was an act of moral and political courage which, despite its lack of precise definition and lateness on the political scene, appealed powerfully to those who sought an alternative to the Alliance. And the Coalition was a viable alternative.

While the NFP and the WUF grappled with the problem of forging a mutually acceptable political arrangement, the Alliance was in the final stages of planning its campaign strategies. The Alliance, in comparison with its rivals, has always been a better prepared, certainly more disciplined party. In 1982, its organizational preparedness and sophistication was remarkable, and by contrast highlighted the relative weaknesses of its competitors. The Alliance headquarters was given a thorough shake-up and Adi Losalini Dovi, the Secretary of the party, sacked for bureaucratic ineptness. Isimeli Bose, a University of the South Pacific graduate and former lecturer and now the shipping manager of Burns, Philp, was appointed the general campaign director. In 1981 he had been sent by the Alliance to Papua New Guinea and Australia specifically to study campaign strategies there. He was based in Suva where the central Alliance headquarters was located. A publicity committee of Bose, Ahmed Ali and L. G. Usher, former editor of the *Fiji Times*, oversaw media advertisements and prepared *The Alliance Newsletter*, which contained detailed notes on party platform, effective rebuttal of opposition claims and other relevant details about polling and registration. These were circulated widely around the country. Traditional networks of Fijian village life, for long in disuse and disrepair, were reactivated to ensure a high Fijian voter turnout so crucial for an Alliance victory. By February 1982 some 600 small polling committees had been set up at village level. Bose was able to claim with justified pride his part in creating 'the most comprehensive and complex party political system ever put together in Fiji'.⁴³

The Coalition, on the other hand, had a more decentralized structure with campaign headquarters in Lautoka and Suva though these, in practice, revolved around certain candidates. There was little evidence of any co-ordination of effort or co-operation between them. There were, of course, individual sparks of energy and alertness but these were few and their influence was localized. Unlike the Alliance, the Coalition did not have periodic collective briefing of candidates, which explains the occasional discordant notes coming from its ranks. The Alliance candidates sang in unison. Reddy's location in Lautoka did not help either. The Coalition had its own *Bulletin* which after a fitful start died a premature, unnoticed death. It was forced to rely on media advertisements, a game which the Alliance played with consummate skill. Towards the end, though, the Coalition briefly had the upper hand but by then its earlier weaknesses had probably already had their effect. However, in one respect the Coalition did surpass itself, and perhaps even the Alliance. It had prepared, well before the campaign, a comprehensive and thoughtful manifesto which not only forcefully pointed out flaws and weaknesses in Alliance performance, but described in detail its own policies and areas of concern. The 82 page document was, needless to say, a vast

⁴² Interview with a senior NFP leader who prefers to remain anonymous.

⁴³ *Fiji Times*, 19 Feb. 1982.

improvement on the NFP manifestoes of the past which were usually collections of platitudinous remarks on a whole range of vital issues uttered by senior party functionaries at annual conventions. The Alliance manifesto was a succinct eight page document because the Development Plan Eight contained the details of its policies.

What of the FNP? In contrast to the Alliance and the Coalition, it maintained an uncharacteristically low profile that baffled its opponents.⁴⁴ Sakiasi Butadroka, FNP's Secretary and guiding spirit, focused his efforts in rural areas in southeastern Viti Levu. In fact, he acknowledged that he had been campaigning for this election since 1977. The last five years had been a time of great stress and even disenchantment for the FNP. After its astonishing success in the April 1977 elections when it had attracted a quarter of all Fijian communal votes and won a seat in parliament, contributing in the process to the equally unbelievable defeat of the Alliance, the party had been on the decline.⁴⁵ In the September election, the Nationalists ceased to be the force they had been in April, obtaining only 11% of Fijian communal votes, and losing Butadroka's seat to the Alliance's Tomasi Vakatora. The Alliance had clearly won back its natural constituents, once the Fijians understood the consequence of their 'protest' votes. The FNP misery was compounded by internal disarray. Butadroka was jailed for six months in August 1977 for his 'blood will flow in this country' statement in Suva, and FNP's western leader, Iona Walisiliso, was fined \$100 for making racially provocative remarks. The party President, Ratu Mosese Tuisawau, was declared bankrupt and another leading light, trade unionist Taneila Veitata was in gaol for contravening the Trade Disputes Act.

For the 1982 election, the Nationalists maintained their 'Fiji for Fijians' platform, though it was now less racially slanted than in the past. No public demands were made for the expulsion of Indians, for instance, which had been one of the original platforms of the party. Instead, emphasis was on the preservation and enhancement of Fijian interests in the economic and political life of the country. Some of the specific areas of emphasis were outlined in a convention in Suva. The FNP pledged 'to correct the constitutional status of the Fijian people and improve their economic backwardness' by negotiating and enacting the following changes:⁴⁶

- 1 The amendment of the Constitution of Fiji to allow for Fijian representation in the House of Representatives at 90%, i.e., 46 seats for indigenous Fijians and 10% (six seats) for others.
- 2 A free and compulsory primary and secondary school education for Fijians.
- 3 The establishment of a Fijian Development Institute for the education and promotion of Fijians in commercial and industrial enterprises.
- 4 The setting up of rural employment camps to solve the unemployment problem among Fijians, increase productivity and control inflation.
- 5 The return of all Freehold, Crown Schedules A and B lands to the original Fijian owners, as done in Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands and Vanuatu. This includes the returning of all traditional fishing rights to Fijians.
- 6 The improvement and consolidation of the National Marketing Authority to provide better service to farmers.

⁴⁴ I am grateful to my research assistant Bose Q. Mavoia who interviewed a number of FNP supporters in the Raiwaqa-Raiwai area of Suva and collected data on the party.

⁴⁵ For more details, see Ralph R. Premdas, 'Constitutional challenge: the rise of Fijian nationalism', *Pacific Perspective*, IX: 2 (1980), 30-44; Ali, *op. cit.*, ch. 7.

⁴⁶ Obtained from the FNP headquarters in Suva. Translated from Fijian by Bose Q. Mavoia.

7 The nationalization and diversification of copra, gold and other important industries in which employees, farmers and/or landowners are given shares.

The subtle but important shift in the Nationalists' platform was significant but it attracted little attention from the media and the public at large; and its candidates concentrated on campaigning in Fijian settlements rather than in urban areas. For the most part, the attention focused on the Alliance and the NFP-WUF Coalition.

The state of the economy emerged early as a major issue in the campaign. The difference between the two parties here lay more in the direction the economy was taking and its performance rather than on basic questions of economic philosophy. On the contrary, both the parties explicitly accepted the capitalist mode of economic development and, in fact, promised to make it more efficient. The Coalition accepted the primacy of the 'competitive free enterprise system', and promised minimum government regulation of private business because 'anything which can be done better and more efficiently by the private sector should be left to the private sector'. Foreign investment would be encouraged and investors 'assured of their right to repatriate their capital and income'.⁴⁷ The Alliance was equally enthusiastic about private investment, recognizing its 'essential role in national development and creation of jobs'.⁴⁸ Its record in promoting enterprises such as Pacific Harbour, Soqulu estate development and, of course, the tourist industry spoke for themselves.

But there were areas of controversy. The Coalition attacked the Alliance's management of the economy, with ammunition derived from official statistics. It relied heavily on a gloomy picture of the economy pointed by the high-level Financial Review Committee which had prophesied bankruptcy of the country to the tune of \$51.7 million by 1983 unless current trends were arrested. It raised the 'certain prospect of massive unemployment' which developments in pine, fish and copper industries, among others, seemed unlikely to alleviate. The unemployment rate, which had been steadily increasing, was 16.2% in 1981 according to the committee,⁴⁹ and it especially affected young Fijian school leavers. Inflation (11.3%), mounting squatter problems, rapidly increasing food imports (which had soared by 270% between 1971 and 1981 while the population had increased by 25%),⁵⁰ the widening foreign trade gap from \$153 million in 1980 to \$271 million in 1981,⁵¹ and a generally sluggish growth of the economy (3.2%) were all issues the Coalition raised during the campaign, frequently supported by a confounding barrage of statistics. It proposed to expand and diversify a number of agro-based industries—dairy, poultry, citrus, fishery—to curb inflation, provide employment in rural areas and to make the country self-sufficient in at least some food items. It promised tax concessions to employers who created employment opportunities. Finally, the Coalition set the target at 7% growth rate for the country.

The Alliance admitted difficulties but placed Fiji's economic problems firmly in the context of international recession, rising oil prices and fluctuating prices of such commodities as sugar which accounts for a substantial part of the country's foreign exchange earnings. But not all was gloomy, and it produced its own array of figures to support a picture of substantial achievements in the face of adversity.⁵² The number of

⁴⁷ *NFP-WUF Manifesto*, p. 8, 17, 43.

⁴⁸ *The Alliance Manifesto*, p. 5.

⁴⁹ *The Coalition Bulletin*, No. 3 (Apr. 1982). In 1979, 21,000 (10.7%) of the work force was unemployed; in 1980 23,000 (11.3%). See Bureau of Statistics, *Fiji Facts and Figures 1980*.

⁵⁰ *NFP-WUF Manifesto*, p. 29.

⁵¹ *The Fiji Economy in 1981* (Central Planning Office, Mar. 1982), p. 4.

⁵² See the *Alliance Newsletter* No. 8 (Apr. 1982) and the *Manifesto*.

university scholarships had been doubled, the Lome Convention had given more than \$108 million to the sugar industry, royalties and rents paid to Fijian landowners through the Native Land Trust Board had increased from \$894,000 to \$3,966,000 between 1971 and 1981, and the South Pacific Region Trade and Economic Agreements (SPARTECA) agreements held promises of better trade deals with Australia. And, of course, the Alliance questioned the promises of the Opposition in the face of its performance, particularly the 7% growth figure, somewhat unfairly as it had itself achieved 12.5% growth rate in 1979 and 6% in 1980. But the economic debate generated more heat than light. Alternative paths to development were not discussed, something which has become a major issue in many developing countries. In the ultimate analysis, the debate revolved around the question of which party could make the capitalist system work better.

The Coalition also made an issue of the conduct of government under the Alliance. It argued for 'parliamentary' democracy where the parliament and not the cabinet was supreme, as had seemed to become the practice under the Alliance. Troops had been committed to Lebanon and Sinai on the decision of the cabinet and not the parliament, and some large tracts of Crown land in Viti Levu had been reserved without any parliamentary debate. The Coalition proposed to halt this trend through the use of 'parliamentary committees, with members drawn from all parties and different sections of our society'. This, it argued, would not only widen discussions on a wide range of issues but also lessen the increasing Alliance dependence on foreign consultants and advisers. But along with advocating open government, the Coalition pressed the idea of a truly multiracial cabinet, reflecting the interests of all sections of the community. It pointed out that while Indians comprised half the total population, there was only one elected Indian in the Alliance cabinet, a situation it would correct immediately. It was in this context that Jai Ram Reddy talked of basing his cabinet on the Singapore model.⁵³

The Alliance focused on its record in office, and pointed out that economic prosperity and political stability enjoyed by Fiji were the result of its own efforts. Few other third world countries had enjoyed the peace and freedom that Fiji had since independence, it reminded the voters. But the Alliance trump card, as always, was its undisputed leader, Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara. He was not perhaps the same awe inspiring, seemingly indispensable and invincible statesman that he appeared to have been in the 1970s, but in comparison to others he still remained a commanding figure. His performance in the international arena remained undimmed. Warm, respectful words of praise from Malcolm Fraser, Indira Gandhi, Julius Chan, not to mention lesser luminaries, were prominently advertized in the press and espoused at every opportunity on the hustings. The visit of Dr Mahatir, the Prime Minister of Malaya, and Mara's own to Canberra at the invitation of the Liberal Party immediately before the election, simply reinforced the image of his comfortable standing in the big league.

Jai Ram Reddy enjoyed few of Mara's advantages of high traditional status, long experience in politics, and undisputed leadership of his party. He was appointed to the senate in 1972, entered the parliament in April 1977, became the leader of the Flower

⁵³ Ratu Mara quickly pointed out that using the Singapore concept would mean replacing the Governor General with a President. Equally swiftly, the Coalition pointed out that it had no such intentions and in fact said that the present Governor General could stay in office 'for as long as he likes'. Mara then said that if the Coalition wants to extend Ratu George Cakobau's term in office indefinitely, why were they calling him too old to rule! And so it went on.

faction when the NFP split up and was appointed the Opposition leader after the September elections. His rise was meteoric, indicating both political astuteness and a fine sense of survival on his part, qualities which have not been recognized in Fiji. Reddy described himself as a 'first among equals' probably more out of necessity than choice. One of his most remarkable achievements was not only healing the wounds of 1977 but also putting together a team which included young and talented professionals. In doing so, he broke the traditional dominance in the party of 'a gaggle of squabbling lawyers', as one NFP candidate, Mumtaz Ali (accountant), described it in his handout. Furthermore, being essentially a moderate person, he set a tone that closed the era of confrontationist politics which had long been the hallmark of the NFP, and extremely popular among Indians. Reddy was thoughtful and eloquent, but he lacked charisma, something which was compensated for by Ratu Osea Gavidia as he travelled incessantly across the country with a sample of imported food items and used them to attack the exploitation by big business and Fiji's dependency on the foreign market. Gavidia's dynamism, vigour and unquestioned loyalty to the Coalition endeared him to the NFP's predominantly Indian supporters, as they turned a blind eye to the pending court cases of fraud against him. His defeat hurt them more than the defeat of the party itself. As leader of the WUF, he was the deputy leader of the Coalition and widely tipped to be deputy prime minister in a Coalition government.

A number of smaller issues threatened briefly to erupt in the campaign. One of these was the shortage of drugs at the Colonial War Memorial Hospital in Suva.⁵⁴ The Minister of Health, Mohammed Ramzan, denied a shortage during a heated debate in the last session of parliament. The Prime Minister later admitted the shortage 'at times' after meeting a delegation of consultants from the hospital. Dr George Hemming, a private medical practitioner, who conducted a one man enquiry into the whole affair, confirmed the consultants' contentions, adding that significant drug shortages had existed for a long time. Ramzan's credibility was in tatters, but the government deftly pre-empted the issue by voting additional funds for the purchase of vital drugs. Law and order, too, surfaced briefly but failed to capture the public imagination.

As the campaign proceeded, the Alliance exhorted the voters to 'Keep Fiji in Good Hands', if they wanted to have 'Business As Usual' and avoid economic and also racial turbulence. The choice between the Coalition and the Alliance was a simple one: it was a choice between experience and experiment, performance and promise. The Coalition, on the other hand, pointed to the persistent woes of a sluggish economy, preponderant influence of big businesses, and a general atmosphere of stagnation under the Alliance, and told the electorate that it was 'Time For a Change'⁵⁵ for a 'Better Tomorrow.'

In the last fortnight of the campaign, all the controversies about the economy, leadership, division and unity paled into insignificance, with the disclosures by the ABC-TV current affairs programme, 'Four-Corners', of foreign (Australian) interference in the Fiji elections. The programme highlighted the role and influence of Australian multinationals in Fiji⁵⁶ and questioned the validity of imposing Western political standards on third world countries. In particular it dwelt on the contents of the

⁵⁴ For more details see both the *Fiji Sun* and the *Fiji Times* for Apr. 1982.

⁵⁵ This was also one of the slogans of the NFP in the 1977 election, though it did not capture the imagination of the people in the way it did in 1982. Some NFP candidates had used these words in 1972.

⁵⁶ For an earlier exposé, see Amelia Rokotuivuna, et al., *Fiji: A Developing Australian Colony* (Melbourne 1974).

Carroll Report which was reported not only to recommend questionable tactics for winning elections but also to involve misuse of Australian aid money by the Alliance party. The Coalition, which had already made an issue of the Carroll Report, obtained a copy of the TV programme, made over 300 copies of it and screened them widely throughout the country, especially in Suva and Lautoka. With the 'Four-Corners' programme in hand the Coalition, which had been optimistic about its chances, was now confident of a large victory.

The full circumstances surrounding the 'Four-Corners' programme and the origin of the Carroll Report are not known yet, and the government has instituted a full enquiry into the whole question of foreign involvement in the elections. What follows is pieced from published and other widely available sources in Fiji. The report in question, entitled 'Report of Consultants to the Prime Minister of Fiji on the Economic and Political Outlook and Options for Strategy and Political Organization', was prepared by Alan Carroll, an international economic and business consultant, with the help of three others. They were Jeffrey Race, head of the Thailand-based company Asian Strategies, and consultant to a multinational 'service' organization, Business International;⁵⁷ Rosemary Gillespie, a Melbourne market researcher—who leaked the information to the 'Four-Corners' team; and Geoff Allen, director of Australian Industries Development Association (AIDA), a big business lobby organization. The final report was prepared in November 1981 after preliminary discussions between the consultants and the Prime Minister (and his close advisers) from 16 to 20 September.⁵⁸ At that preliminary meeting, a number of campaign strategies were recommended, most significant among them being the need to upgrade the party's organizational structure and to improve relations with the media. Some of these had been acted upon by the Prime Minister and his close advisers, such as sending Isimeli Bose to Papua New Guinea and Australia for further tutoring in campaign strategies and the appointment of an Australian aid funded media consultant, Clive Speed, to the Ministry of Information, working closely with the Prime Minister's office.

In the final report some of these recommendations were elaborated, along with ways to cope with sensitive public issues unearthed in Gillespie's opinion survey with the assistance of some local university students.⁵⁹ The consultants recommended, among other things, the need to 'conduct an image-building campaign emphasizing some such theme as re-birth, renewal, new sense of movement, or the like', the appointment of impartial commissions of enquiry into the Native Land Trust Board and the pine industry about which there was substantial public dissatisfaction; 'stronger commitment to mobilizing the energies of the private sector'; consolidation of Fijian support 'while expanding the Alliance's support among the Indian community'; identification of marginal seats on the basis of a detailed constituency-by-constituency analysis; the establishment of a 'think-tank of sound, experienced and well-informed persons to test ideas against'; the development of 'a series of innovations and initiatives which it [the Alliance] can release at intervals'. Besides these innocuous and quite pedestrian suggestions a number of specific measures were recommended, which were highlighted by the 'Four-Corners' programme and published by the Coalition in the *Fi-*

⁵⁷ More details about the BI are provided in Richard Barnet and R. E. Muller, *Global Reach: The Power of the Multinational Corporation* (New York 1974). See also Marian Wilkinson, 'Australian involvement sparks Fiji election row', *The National Times*, 4-10 July 1982.

⁵⁸ Source: Carroll Report, covering letter from Alan Carroll to Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara.

⁵⁹ What follows is a summary of some of the more pertinent points which were presented to the people of Fiji through the media.

ji Sun. To gain Indian support, the report suggested the mobilization of Muslim (and Gujarati) communities through appointments, oral commitments and promise of representation in the Alliance Government, without being overly 'blatant'. To prevent the draining of Fijian communal votes to the splinter parties, the report recommended bribery (FNP leader: 'either buy off or take him out of running') and acceleration of impending prosecutions (Gavidi: 'since he is going to jail anyway, best to pile all effort on and accelerate prosecutions so he cannot run'). 'Combine divide and rule with stroking', the report suggested; 'capitalize on the existing splits and weaknesses of the NFP'; obtain 'Fijian support by getting chiefs on ticket'; 'get credit for pro-Fijian stance currently without jeopardizing expansion of Indian support', and let dropouts from cabinet leave happy or 'make sure they understand they will be sorry if they challenge the Alliance (get something on them)'. These were among some of the widely publicized aspects of the Carroll Report which the electorate read with increasing amazement in the media.

The existence of the report was first disclosed by Jai Ram Reddy at a political meeting in Waiyavi on 22 June, when he generally described some of its contents.⁶⁰ Four days later at major Coalition rallies in Tavua and Rakiraki, Reddy revealed the names of the persons who had prepared the report, and outlined in more detail their 'treacherous' recommendations.⁶¹ He expressed concern at the involvement of Business International and raised questions about the role of Clive Speed. Speed was accused not only of helping the Alliance with its media campaign, but also of passing political information—'situation reports'—to Alan Carroll. Copies of these, which Speed said were personal and confidential, were published in the *Fiji Sun*.⁶²

The Alliance's response to Reddy's revelations was surprisingly contradictory and confusing. On 26 June, Ratu Mara at a 500-strong meeting in Naulu, Nasinu, effectively denied the allegations, labelling them 'really stupid . . . attempts to bamboozle and mislead the electorate'.⁶³ The Alliance, Mara went on, 'was doing its own planning through an able campaign planner, Mr Isimeli Bose'. It was the NFP, Mara argued, which had relied on outside assistance, referring to a public address given by David Coombe of the Australian Labor Party at an NFP convention in Nadi. The following day, 27 June, speaking at Wairebatia, Lautoka, he admitted the existence of the report, arguing that the conducting of the survey by the outside experts was a 'perfectly normal practice' in any democratic society: 'We had people come in and do an opinion poll so that we can know how the people exactly feel about the Government and the issues that are dear to them'.⁶⁴ On 31 July, as the Coalition's all-out effort focused on the controversial recommendations, the Alliance publicly refuted the claim that the report prepared for it by the experts suggested using religious and ethnic divisions. Sensing that Reddy did not have the full report, the Alliance challenged him to release it to the public.⁶⁵ In a paid advertisement the following day, the Alliance strongly repudiated the Coalition's claim that Clive Speed, who had by now emerged as a central issue, was working for the Alliance party,⁶⁶ and accused Reddy of inciting 'racial feelings' by referring to the consultants as 'expatriates'.

⁶⁰ *Fiji Times*, 24 July 1982.

⁶¹ *Sunday Times*, 27 June 1982; *Sunday Sun*, 27 June.

⁶² *Fiji Sun*, 7 July 1982.

⁶³ *Fiji Sun*, 28 June 1982.

⁶⁴ *Fiji Times*, 28 June 1982.

⁶⁵ *Fiji Times*, 1 July 1982.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*

The series of allegations and counter-allegations continued with heightening tension when the 'Four-Corners' programme was screened in Fiji. A number of contradictions and inconsistencies were highlighted in it. Mara's claim that he and his officials had 'found' Clive Speed was at variance with what Carroll himself had written to Mara. Isimeli Bose's statement that he was a part of Burns, Philp's contribution to the Alliance and that his salary was partly covered by that company was denied by Mara,⁶⁷ while Burns, Philp refused to comment. Mahendra Motibhai Patel was found in the awkward situation of being presented with evidence contradicting his denial of any role in providing contacts for Rosemary Gillespie in Suva. Later he admitted commissioning and funding the report on his own, without involving the Alliance Party. This claim cannot be squared with the contents of the covering letter from Alan Carroll to Ratu Mara referring to his team of four as 'your (Mara's) consultants'.⁶⁸

The 'Four-Corners' programme was a bombshell for which the Alliance appeared ill-prepared. But after momentary silence, its reaction was swift. On a whirlwind tour of the Western Division, Mara condemned the TV team's visit 'as an act of political sabotage against a sovereign nation'. The team had collaborated with the Coalition to discredit the government, Mara asserted; 'they tried to bully people into speaking to them without revealing the purpose of their interviews'.⁶⁹ He stated that it was only on 5 July that he had read the complete version of the Carroll Report, some eight months after it was completed and handed to him, and found 'some of the ideas it contained unacceptable and repugnant to everything the Alliance stands for'. In any case, Mara argued, there was no evidence in the Alliance campaign that these had been implemented.⁷⁰ Reddy, of course, counteracted this by pointing to the Alliance courting of the Muslims and Gujeratis.

But the masterstroke of the Alliance was to seize upon and twist the opening words of the programme that Fiji's present political leaders were descendants of chiefs who 'clubbed and ate their way to power' and to tell the Fijians that the Australian team, and by associating with it the Coalition, had gravely insulted Fijian chiefs and tradition. The serious and damaging allegations made in the report were cast by the wayside as these 'insulting' remarks were highlighted in the campaign. The tactic worked. In Lautoka, about 300 women marched to Reddy's residence demanding an apology for 'insulting' a high Fijian chief by approving the screening of the 'Four-Corners' programme.⁷¹ One of Reddy's earlier uncharacteristic and unfortunate slips-of-the-tongue that Mara would even open a toilet to shake a few more Indian hands to get their votes, widely and unfairly publicized by the Alliance as an insult to Fijian people, was resurrected to portray Reddy as a racist.⁷²

The campaign maintained its bitter, intense pace even after polling began on 10 July. Both parties waged their battles against each other and competed for the attention (and votes) of the electorate through hard-hitting, sometimes petty, advertisements in the nation's two dailies which kept up an extensive, if disappointingly unanalytical, coverage of the entire election. In the end, the media became an unwitting and unconscious tool of politicians whose sole concern was to make the next day's headlines.

⁶⁷ See Mara's statement reported in *Fiji Sun*, 6 July 1982.

⁶⁸ It was later revealed that Patel had brought Gillespie to Fiji on 'contra Tickets' provided by Qantas to the Fiji Visitors Bureau, of which he is chairman.

⁶⁹ See *Fiji Sun*, 4 July 1982; and also *Fiji Times* of the same date.

⁷⁰ *Fiji Times*, 6 July 1982.

⁷¹ *Fiji Times*, 10 July 1982. A spate of letters appeared in the press in the same vein.

⁷² Reddy uttered these words in a meeting in Labasa on 18 June 1982.

Mara did precisely this when on the eve of the close of polling (17 July) he threatened to resign if the Alliance won fewer than 30 seats.⁷³ His main aim, probably, was to spur more (Fijian) people into the polling booth.⁷⁴ He used the occasion to reinforce his own interpretation that the Coalition and the ABC-TV had cast grave aspersions on Fijian tradition and culture, and denigrated the Coalition for insulting him and his people for which they 'will not be forgotten or forgiven'. Mara, with some expert assistance from the Alliance publicity committee, managed to utilize the nation's two dailies to his great advantage and turned a possible defeat into victory. The media, with the possible exception of the *Fiji Sun* which displayed greater tenacity and courage and continued throughout the latter half of the campaign to speak out on issues, watched from the sidelines. There was no analysis, no serious commentary or probing questions, but simply the transmission of the proceedings of the campaign.

The impact of the media and the melodrama of the last two weeks of the campaign was difficult to gauge. But the first few results before midnight on Saturday showed a pattern of high voter turnout and ethnic polarization that became glaringly obvious by late Sunday afternoon when the final results were announced. Some of these are discussed below. Table 1 summarizes voter registration as well as the final voter turnout figures. It is obvious that for all the groups the 1982 voter turnout figures are the highest ever. Why should this be so? An important factor was the wide interest created in this election by the extensive media coverage. Given the widely shared expectation of an extremely close outcome, both the major parties exhorted their supporters to turn out in force. Voting in Fiji is not compulsory and the electorate has more or less come to expect free transport, provided by the parties, to the polling booth. Both the Alliance and the Coalition, aware of this reality, were well prepared with hired cars, buses, and in rural areas tractors or any other available means of transport. The Alliance made extra efforts to ensure a high Fijian voter turnout, well aware that its victory hinged on this crucial factor. Its defeat in the 1977 April elections, it did not need to be reminded, was as much a result of low Fijian voter turnout as it was due to Nationalists. It was well-oiled machinery at work that increased Fijian voter turnout by almost 15% between April 1977 and this election.

Certain seats generated more interest than others. The Alliance made an all-out effort to dislodge Jai Ram Reddy from the Lautoka Indian Communal seat with the help of Surendra Prasad, a former NFP man. Reddy won handsomely by 6,169 votes. It was equally optimistic about winning the Nausori-Levuka Indian Communal seat contested for the party by Kaur Battan Singh, another former NFP member. Singh lost to NFP's Sharda Nand by 6,717 votes. In both these constituencies, over 88% of the voters turned up at the polls. But the seat which had created the greatest amount of interest was the Nadroga-Navosa Fijian Communal seat contested by WUF President, Ratu Osea Gavidi, and Alliance's Dr Apenisa Kuruisaqila. Here voter turnout was 89.3%, which was a dramatic increase over the 59.7% turnout in April 1977 and 75.2% in September. The General Electors maintained a uniform 83% turnout in their three communal seats.

However, this election will long be known for its extreme ethnic polarization. The Fijians and General Electors have always voted overwhelmingly for the Alliance and Indians for the NFP as Table 3 shows. The results of this election underlined that trend starkly. Fijians rallied behind the Alliance in the largest numbers ever, as did the

⁷³ *Fiji Times*, 18 July 1982.

⁷⁴ See Robert Keith-Reid, 'A Nation Divided: Fiji's Election Aftermath', *Islands Business* (Aug. 1982), 13.

TABLE 2⁷⁵ – Voter Registration and Turnout

Ethnic Group	Total Est. Voting Pop. (at 31 Mar. 1982)	Total Regis- tered	% Registered	% Turn- out 1982	Sept.	April	1972
					1977	1977	
Fijian	147,648	141,846	96.1	85.6	77.4	71.0	77.9
Indian	150,987	142,529	94.4	85.2	75.0	76.9	84.7
General Electors	9,996	7,966	79.7	83.3	—	81.5	81.3
	308,631	292,341	94.7				

Indians behind the NFP. Indian solidarity would stand out even more if one discounted the abnormal circumstances of September 1977 when the Dove and Flower factions of the NFP competed for Indian votes and the Alliance did not field candidates in the seats certain to provide support to the Flower faction,⁷⁶ such as in Lautoka where the Alliance openly supported the Flower faction leader Reddy against the Dove leader Siddiq Koya. Overall, though, fewer Fijians have voted for the NFP than Indians have for the Alliance. Indians split their votes more readily than Fijians. It is also clear that since 1972 the extent of Fijian support for the NFP has declined dramatically. In the April 1977 elections, for example, the NFP fielded only one Fijian Communal candidate (Bua-Macuata) who received a mere 105 votes and thus lost his 'deposit'. In the September elections, they did not put up a single candidate. In 1982 its Fijian candidates fared worse than had been expected; and this despite its coalition with a Fijian party.

The reasons for the lack of Fijian support for the NFP, a predominantly Indian party, are many and varied. The 96 years of separate institutional and social existence under colonial rule have bred feelings of suspicion and distrust that die hard. The Indians' individualistic tendencies, their tortuous and relentless struggle for political equality, demand for the security of land tenure, and greater success at the middle level of the economy, have all served to reinforce the fear, real or otherwise, in Fijian minds of the Indian attempt to dominate. The NFP's own past history has exacerbated their fears. Its platform of common roll system of voting, the policy (now discarded) to make Fiji a republic with an elected indigenous head of state, the intemperate remarks and sometimes insensitive attitudes of its leaders regarding 'things Fijian' (land for example) and constant in-fighting, have all served to keep Fijians away from the party. But things had looked different in 1982, apart from the fact of the Coalition. Reddy was not hampered by the communal image like some of the older members of his party.

⁷⁵ This Table is composed from figures supplied by the Fiji Electoral Office and from voting figures published in the press. The bulk of the registration was done by the Electoral Office. The Alliance registered 14,304 (4.6%) of whom 10,503 (73%) were Fijians, 2,104 (14%) were Indians and 1,697 (11.9%) were General Electors. The NFP registered 9,799 voters of whom 356 (3.6%) were Fijians, 9,406 (96%) were Indians and 37 (0.4%) were General Electors. The WUF registered 400 Fijian voters and the FNP did no registration of its own at all.

⁷⁶ For more discussion, see Ali, *op. cit.*, ch. 7, and Ralph Premdas, 'Elections in Fiji: restoration of the balance in September 1977', *Journal of Pacific History*, XIV (1979), 194-207.

He had carefully distanced himself from the old, contentious, communal platforms of the NFP, and refrained from talking about them in the campaign.

And yet, Fijian communal support ultimately eluded his party. There could be many reasons. The NFP's own Fijian communal candidates were usually men or women of little experience and, more importantly, of even less standing in their own community; and status counts for a lot in any traditional society. They made their quiet appearance at election time, and then made an even quieter exit, usually in the direction of the FNP.⁷⁷ By contrast, the Alliance candidates were not only persons of greater ability and a longer period of public service but also of very high status—usually chiefs. The problem of attracting a better calibre of Fijian communal candidate is likely to remain with the NFP in the foreseeable future. It has also been suggested that NFP's association with the WUF, a regional Fijian party, discouraged non-western Fijians from supporting it. Perhaps, though the argument does not sound convincing in face of the record of the past discussed above.

The most widely held views in Fiji about the paucity of Fijian support for the NFP—and the Coalition generally—suggest that a tidal wave was in fact coming, but was suddenly halted by Reddy's 'toilet remarks' and the 'cannibal quote' of the 'Four-Corners' programme. There can be no doubt about the impact of these, especially the latter. The Alliance's deft distortions of the remarks, when translated into Fijian and dramatized in emotional speeches around the country, reduced everything to one simple sectarian issue: insult to Fijian chiefs and traditions. But the influence of the 'Four-Corners' programme should not be overemphasized, because the attendance of Fijians at Coalition meetings in somewhat larger numbers than in the past did not necessarily mean their votes also. In any case, even western Fijian support was low.

Moreover, the 'insult' theory does not give credit to the considerable efforts of the Alliance party in regaining its natural constituency among Fijian communal voters. The intensity of its media campaign, the strength of its leadership, the unity of the party and its record of achievements, the work of the numerous grassroots polling commit-

TABLE 3(A)—Fijian Communal Voting Pattern

Party	1982 (%)	1977 September	1977 April	1972
Alliance	83.7	80.5	64.7	83.1
NFP	0.8	0.1 (one seat only)	—	2.4
FNP	7.7	11.6	24.4	—
WUF	7.0	—	—	—

TABLE 3(B)—Indian Communal Voting Pattern

Alliance	15.3	14.4	15.6	24.1
NFP	84.1	84.9	73.2	74.3

⁷⁷ Among the Fijian Nationalist Party candidates in 1982 were two former NFP candidates: Iliesa Duvulaco and Timoci Naco. Ratu Mosese Tuisawau had also been with the NFP before he joined the Nationalists.

tees, were all instrumental in consolidating and increasing the Fijian support. The process of consolidation had begun soon after 1977 and active planning for this election since early 1981. The memory of 1977 also helped when protest votes against the party had resulted in an unintended, unexpected consequence for which the Fijian people were ill-prepared. The lesson was clear: Fijian unity alone would ensure the retention of political power in the hands of the Fijians, as Mara had reminded delegates of the Fijian Association at Rakiraki in 1981.⁷⁸ The Alliance's organizational superiority and gradual shift to the right cut the ground from under Butadroka's feet. At a post-election conference, Butadroka predicted that 'I will be still around in the next five years'.⁷⁹ His party may not be. The factors which accounted for the decline of the Nationalists also explain the poor performance of the WUF which, even with its regionalist philosophy, did not attract much support from the western Fijians. Outside Nadroga-Navosa and Nadi the WUF failed to obtain any following. Gavidi's seat was one that the Alliance made an all-out effort to win and this proved the decisive factor in Gavidi's loss. But his own miscalculations and poor strategic planning also played a part. Gavidi spent a surprising amount of effort and time on broad national issues. Kuruisaqila, on the other hand, courted his constituency assiduously. The fact that Gavidi's wife, Tui, stood in the adjacent Serua-Namosi seat, and that he campaigned vigorously for her, did not help Gavidi either. And finally, some of his statements, such as that it was time for an 'Indian' prime minister, merely served to arouse old fears and prejudices and had a counterproductive effect in an ethnically polarized atmosphere.

The Alliance fared better in attracting Indian support, though not nearly as well as it had during those bright days of 1972. As in the past, the party derived its greatest Indian strength from the sugar cane belt of western Viti Levu where in four constituencies (Nadi, Ba, Ba-Lautoka, and Lautoka) it got 21% of the Indian communal votes. Its weakest areas remained southeastern Viti Levu and Vanua Levu. The fact that the Alliance was able to get 16% of the Indian communal votes was a significant achievement, especially since the Indian Alliance was inactive and all its leading lights had either left the party or been shunted to the periphery. In fact, of all the founding members of the Indian Alliance, only Manikam Pillay remained with the party. At campaign rallies in the Western Division and some other areas also, branch functionaries repudiated their allegiance to the Alliance and asked forgiveness for their past 'treachery'. The main grievance seemed to rest with the party leader who, it was alleged, had refused or was unwilling to listen to the problems facing the Indian community. The new-look NFP welcomed the ex-Indian Alliance members enthusiastically.

However, this withdrawal of support was counterbalanced by the open or silent support given to the Alliance by members of the former Dove faction and the Muslims. The NFP preached that its unity was unshakeable, yet as Raojibhai Patel, an ex-Dove, said in his speeches, the unity 'was not properly processed'. This was particularly so in Suva city and western Viti Levu which had been the scenes of bitter campaigning by the two factions in 1977. To the Doves loyalty to Koya preceded any loyalties to the party. Since Koya was only lukewarm in his support for the Coalition, they stayed away from the NFP. In Lautoka, the Doves actively campaigned against Reddy, so fierce was their loyalty to their former leader.

Koya's general indifference revived memories of 1977 and discouraged Muslims

⁷⁸ *Fiji Times*, 18 July 1981.

⁷⁹ *Fiji Sun*, 19 July 1982.

from going back to the NFP. Many of them had left the party after the bitter 1977 elections when all possible means, including religion, had been used to obtain votes. To them, the new NFP was dominated largely by the Flower (Hindu) faction which was insensitive to Muslim feelings and problems. Thus they turned their eyes towards the Alliance, silently encouraged by the leadership of the Fiji Muslim League whose president has long been with that party. At the same time, Mara mounted his own campaign to woo the disenchanted Muslims, through speeches at their functions, opening schools, promises of further assistance and a generally cordial attitude. He even praised Koya and expressed a willingness to work with him, which was a dramatic reversal of his position in 1977 when he had threatened to resign if Koya was elected Leader of Opposition. It is not surprising that many Muslims turned to the Alliance with the expectation of a better future for them. The drift of Muslims away from the NFP is likely to continue.

The Gujeratis, who dominate the Indian business in the country, too, were widely tipped to give strong support to the Alliance. The big Gujerati businessmen have always been with the Alliance and have prospered under its rule. The Alliance promised 'business as usual'; they could ask for nothing better. But the extent of non-big business Gujerati support for the party is genuinely in doubt. It would be safe to assume that many of them would have remained with the NFP, if for no other reason than out of respect for the lingering memory of its founder, A. D. Patel.

As for the General Electors, they reaffirmed their support for the Alliance with an overwhelming majority: 90% of the valid votes cast in the three General Communal constituencies. The NFP candidates could manage only a paltry 8%, the Nationalists only 2%. The General Electors—who in fact hold the balance of power with their three communal seats—have been firmly with the Alliance since the advent of party politics in Fiji. The NFP, especially its old guard, on the other hand, has been critical of the disproportionate political strength of the General Electors (Europeans, Chinese, mixed races), who constitute a mere 4% of the population but have eight (15.4%) seats in the Parliament, three communal and five national. In the latter, however, the General Electors have little influence; it is the Fijian and Indian voters who decide who gets elected.

Most of the 25 National (cross-voting) seats reflect the pattern of voting in the communal seats, as there is little splitting of votes across party lines. In those national constituencies where there is a marked disparity in the numerical strength of the two major groups, the result is a foregone conclusion, irrespective of the personal qualities of candidates. It is on those where there is an approximate ethnic balance that the parties focus their interest. There were three such Indian and Fijian National constituencies in this election. One was the North Eastern National constituency.⁸⁰ The Alliance candidates were two ministers of state, Sakiasi Waqanivalagi and Ishwari Bajpai. The Coalition candidates were Filimone Nalatu (WUF) and Iqbal Khan (NFP), who was given the seat after his elder brother M. T. Khan's death. Both the Alliance candidates were experienced and well known personalities who had contested the seat ever since 1972, besides enjoying the advantages of ministerial status. Yet they both lost their seats narrowly to the Coalition opponents. Waqanivalagi polled 10,534 votes (46.7%), Nalatu 10,778 (47.7%), and Mikaeli Vauvau (FNP) 1,255 votes (5.6%). In the Indian seat, it was a straight contest between the Alliance and the Coalition; Bajpai

⁸⁰ Fijians 11,225, Indians 14,706, General Electors 285.

got 11,056 (49.1%) votes to Khan's 11,463 (50.9%). One reason for this outcome was, of course, the general ethnic polarization. But there were others, and in the case of Waganivalagi's defeat, an important reason was the success of the Nationalists. The FNP no longer was the force it had been in April 1977 when it had won 2,417 (11.8%) of the votes cast for the seat, yet it remained a sufficient force to dislodge the Alliance. The disarray in the Indian Alliance, too, played its role, and its ineffectiveness was claimed by both the Alliance candidates as an important factor in their defeat. And, surprisingly, the 'Four-Corners' programme paid dividends for the Coalition when a number of Indian Alliance supporters, including the president of the Tavua Branch, resigned in the last week of the election in protest against the Carroll Report.

The South-Eastern National seat also held the promise of a close tussle.⁸¹ It had been won by the NFP, with a generous measure of support from the Nationalists, in April 1977, but with the evaporation of FNP support, the Alliance had regained the constituency in September. In 1982, with the failure of the Nationalists who won only 2,430 votes (8.4% in comparison to 25.5% in April 1977) and high Fijian voter turnout, the Alliance won the seat with little difficulty. Semesa Sikivou, the former Minister of Education, came from the area and was well known while Beniram Bissessar, a Nausori businessman, was popular for his public service. In contrast, the Coalition candidates were new to national politics and came from outside. The death of Shiu Narayan Kanhai, the NFP's energetic and able Secretary, who had won the Indian National seat in April 1977, had left a gap that newcomers could not fill. The inexplicable failure of the party leaders to campaign in the constituency lessened further any chances of victory.

Among the marginal seats, the new constituency of Suva National created the greatest amount of interest.⁸² Here there were 12,969 Fijians, 2,823 General Electors and 16,257 Indians. The Alliance early realized the need to put up a strong Fijian candidate who could not only hold his own but help his Indian counterpart. It found one in Ratu David Toganivalu, a senior cabinet minister with a multiracial image, but most importantly with very close links to the Gujerati business community of Suva. The Coalition's choice was the Lord Mayor of Suva, Cr Joape Rokosoi. The Alliance's Indian National candidate was its beleaguered Minister of Health, Mohammed Ramzan, and the NFP's was Mumtaz Ali, a well known local accountant. Both the parties mounted an intense door-to-door campaign with a professionalism and dedication that indicated the arrival of a new era in political campaigning in Fiji. Toganivalu personally maintained a surprisingly low profile as also did Ramzan who relied on old loyalties and his long record of union work. Mumtaz Ali, who entered politics only a year ago, attracted national attention as a perceptive and thoughtful spokesman on economic affairs. There was a widespread feeling that Suva's generally better educated voters would split their votes. There is some evidence that this may have happened, but at the final count, Toganivalu won 13,400 (51.2%) to Rokosoi's 12,234 (46.7%), while Ramzan edged Mumtaz Ali by his 13,221 votes (50.9%) to Ali's 12,590 (48.3%). Even the capital's élite could not escape the national trend of racial voting.

The 1982 General Elections began with the promise of a new era of multi-racial politics in Fiji. It ended by bequeathing a legacy of considerable racial resentment and

⁸¹ Fijians 18,786, Indians 16,257, General Electors 2,823.

⁸² It was the old Suva East constituency with the addition of the Suva Ward from the South Central/Suva West and the exclusion from it (Suva East) of all areas outside Suva City. See *The Constituency Boundaries Commission Report* (Suva 1981), 10.

bitterness. It has illuminated with stunning clarity the pivotal role of ethnicity, reinforced by the racial voting structure, and the ease with which people can and do divide along ethnic lines. Both the political parties will nurture further the ethnic bases of their support, while hoping for a division in their opponents.'

Allegations of foreign involvement engendered strong emotions during the election. Soon afterwards these were compounded when Mara accused the Russians of giving financial support to the NFP, apparently with the knowledge and assistance of the Indian High Commission in Suva.⁸³ The Indian Envoy, Mrs Soonu Kochar, and her husband have also been accused of meddling in the country's internal affairs by attempting to heal the rift in the ranks of the NFP, besides being the agents of the Soviets. The upshot of all this has been a marked deterioration in the hitherto pleasant relations between Fiji and India.⁸⁴ All these allegations will be investigated by a commission of enquiry,⁸⁵ but whatever the outcome, they have destroyed forever the independence with which the people of Fiji approached elections in the past. Proper enquiry is essential, but one hopes it will not be a substitute for a deeper soul-searching within Fiji itself. Meanwhile, to use T. S. Eliot's words, Fiji 'had the experience but missed the meaning'.

BRIJ V. LAL

⁸³ Mara made the allegations in an interview with the Australian journalist, Stuart Inder. Inder's article was reprinted in the *Fiji Times*, 10 Aug. 1982. See also the *Fiji Times* of 4, 5, 7 Aug. 1982.

⁸⁴ *Fiji Times*, 6 Aug. 1982.

⁸⁵ *Fiji Times*, 7 Aug. 1982.